We want to acknowledge that there are some good conceptually fundamental aspects of human life, specified abstractly enough so as to resist their identity as a mere reasons not to have the goal to build human-like robots. psychological instrument, but capable of being translated into One reason, of course, is that in many forms of human-robot testable empirical propositions. Six possible benchmarks are interaction there is nothing gained functionally by going the considered: autonomy, imitation, intrinsic moral value, moral humanoid route, as with, for example, industrial robots on accountability, privacy, and reciprocity. Finally, we discuss an assembly line. There are also presumably numerous how getting the right group of benchmarks in human-robot contexts where the human-like form may work against interaction will, in future years, help inform on the optimal human-robot interaction. For example, an elderly
optimal human-robotiF ane being human.~~~~~~~~~person being helped to the bathroom by a robotic assistant may not want the robot to have a human-like face so as to I. INTRODUCTION not be "looked" at by the robot during such personal moments. It is also true that given current technical In various subfields within computer science, benchmarks limitations, humans may negatively evaluate a robot that has are often employed to measure the relative success of new too much of the appearance but too little of the behavioral work. For example, to test the performance of a new repertoire of a human, part of a phenomenon which is database system one can download a relevant benchmark sometimes referred to in the literature as the "Uncanny (e.g., from www.tpc.org), which comprises a data set with Valley" [1, 2]. which to populate one's database, and a set of queries to run That said, and not to belabor the point, there are equally on the data base. Then one can compare the performance of good reasons to aim to build human-like robots. one's system to those of the wider community. But in the Functionally, for example, human-robot communication will field of human-robot interaction, if one of the goals is to presumably be optimized in many contexts if the robot build increasingly human-like robots, how do we measure conforms to human-like appearance and behavior, rather success? In this paper, we focus on the psychological than asking humans to conform to a computational system aspects of this question. We first set the context in terms of [3, 4, 5, 6] . It is also possible that psychological benefits humanoid robots, and then distinguish between ontological could accrue if humans kept "company" with robotic others and psychological claims about such humanoids. Then we [7] . And psychological benchmarks is as follows: categories of In turn, there are four possible combinations of the interaction that capture conceptually fundamental aspects of ontological and psychological claims. Case 1. The robot human life, specified abstractly enough so as to resist their (ontologically speaking) becomes a human, and people identity as a mere psychological instrument (e.g., as in a (psychologically speaking) believe the robot is a human, and measurement scale), but capable of being translated into act accordingly. Case 2. The robot (ontologically speaking) testable empirical propositions. Although there has been becomes a human, but people (psychologically speaking) important work done to date on examining people's humanneither believe a robot can become human nor act like responses to robots [e.g., 1, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14] and on accordingly. Case 3. The robot cannot (ontologically common metrics for task-oriented human-robot interaction speaking) become a human, but people (psychologically [15] , we know of no literature in the field that has taken speaking) believe the robot is a human, and act accordingly. such a direct approach toward establishing psychological And Case 4. thousand of some of the findings, and replicate them on middle childhood -move beyond such constraints and human-robotic interaction. But, aside from good intuitions become (largely through peer interaction) a relationship and luck, on what bases does one choose which studies to based on equality and mutual respect. Along similar lines, replicate? Indeed, given that human-robotic interaction may Kohlberg and his colleagues [19] proposed that only by the open up new forms of interaction, then even here the latter stages of moral development (occurring in existing corpus of psychological research comes up short. adolescence, if ever) does moral thinking differentiate from Thus in our view the field of HRI would be well-served by fear of punished and personal interests (stages 1 and 2) as moving forward over these next few years toward well as conventional expectations and obedience to social establishing psychological benchmarks. systems (stages 3 and 4) to be characterized as autonomous (stages 5 and 6). Now, autonomy means in part independence from others. For it is only through being an independent thinker and actor that a person can refrain from being unduly influenced by others (e.g., by Neo-Nazis, youth gangs, political movements, and advertising). But as argued by Kahn [20] and others, autonomy is not meant as a divisive individualism, but is highly social, developed through reciprocal interactions on a microgenetic level, and evidenced structurally in incorporating and coordinating considerations of self, others, and society. In other words, the social bounds the individual(ism), and vice-versa.
Clearly the behavior of humanoid robots can and will be programmed with increasing degrees of sophistication to mimic autonomous behavior. But [36, 37] ? Answering situation, would people be equally inclined to stay home this question would go some distance toward establishing each evening for two weeks to help a humanoid as compared the moral underpinnings of human-robot interaction.
to a personal friend and housemate? This question, however, is not so easy to answer. Part of the difficulty is that if you ask questions about robots, D.Moral Accountability human interests are almost always implicated, and thus A defining feature of the moral life, and likely all legal become a confound. For example, if I ask you, "Is it all systems, is that people of sound mind are held morally right or not all right if I take a baseball bat and slug the accountable for their actions. Indeed, that is part of the humanoid?" you might respond, "It's not all right" -reason why many people have difficulty accepting suggesting that you care about the humanoid's wellbeing. deterministic accounts ofhuman life. For ifbehavior is fully But upon probing, your reasoning might be entirely human-determined by exogenous forces, such as contingencies of centered. For example, you might say: "it's not all right reinforcement or culture, or by endogenous forces, such as genes, then there appears no basis for holding people on privacy.) morally accountable for their actions. Granted, from a
The issue then at hand is the following: If humanoids deterministic stance, you can still punish a perpetrator; but (e.g., personal assistants for the home) become increasingly you cannot assign blame. For example, you would not be pervasive in human lives, and increasingly attain the ability able to say to a man who steals money from the poor to to monitor and record personal information -and setting support his lavish lifestyle, "you should not have done that." aside for the moment their ability to transmit that Or, "You could have behaved otherwise." For the man information -what is the effect on people's sense of could simply respond, "I'm not responsible for my behavior. privacy? A nascent issue along similar lines arises today I could not have done otherwise." And such responses seem with systems such as Google's Gmail. As analyzed by to run roughshod over deeply held beliefs about human Friedman, Lin, and Miller [42] , each time a Gmail nature.
subscriber clicks on an email entry, the system retrieves the Accordingly, a benchmark is whether people will come to message and scans the message for keywords provided believe that humanoid robots are morally accountable for the earlier by advertisers. Then the Google system selects and behavior they cause [39] . In our view, there would be two orders the advertisements to display on the subscriber's overarching categories of immoral behaviors to focus on, in screen. In other words, a machine "reads" subscribers' particular. The first involves issues of unfairness or email. An open current psychological question is whether injustice. Imagine, for example, if a robotic daycare people thereby feel that their privacy is in some way assistant unfairly distributes more treats to some children compromised. than others? The criterion question is: Do people hold the These questions become ever more compelling when the humanoid, itself, morally responsible and blameworthy for scenario changes to living or working with humanoids. unfair or unjust acts? The second involves the robot causing Imagine a robot, for example, that moves around the floor of direct harms to people's welfare.
In the moral-one's research lab, and chats with workers, and becomes developmental literature [33] , three forms of welfare have their "friend," but also records the presence of individuals in been investigated extensively: physical (including injury, the lab ("Hi Fred, I noticed yesterday you left early, you sickness, and death), material (including economic feeling okay?"), and, through wireless connectivity, keeps interests), and psychological (including comfort, peace, and track of the flow and content of their email, and shares that mental health). The criterion question here is: Do people information with other robots in the building or around hold the humanoid, itself, morally responsible and town. Granted, if the robot is programmed to share that blameworthy for acts that cause people direct harm? information with other humans, such as one's boss, then the In earlier research, Friedman and Millett [40] explored robot has been turned partly into a surveillance system. But this question in terms of whether undergraduate computer even if that capability is not designed into the robot, the science majors believed that a computer system could be benchmark is whether humanoids in and of themselves, can held morally accountable for acts that caused humans harm. encroach if not infringe on human privacy.
For example, one scenario involved a computer system that F Reciprocity administers medical radiation treatment, and due to a computer error over-radiated a cancer patient. Results
Reciprocity is often viewed to be a central feature ofthe showed that 21% of the students interviewed consistently moral life The "Golden Rule," for example, epitomizes one held computers morally responsible for such errors. Given form reciprocity can take: do unto others as you would have that the stimulus (a computer system) mimicked only a small them do unto you. Moreover, most moral-developmental range of human-like behavior, and that the participants were theorists view reciprocal relationships as fundamental to the technologically savvy, there is good reason to believe that developmental process [18, 19, 33] . For through reciprocal this benchmark -focused on judgments of moral relationships, children take the perspective of others, accountability -will increasingly come into play as such recognize larger sets of problems that involve competing systems take on increasingly sophisticated humanoid forms.
interests, and thereby seek to construct more adequate solutions, more adequate in that the solutions address, for E. Privacy example, a larger set of competing interests. Note that, in Privacy refers to a claim, an entitlement, or a right of an this account, it would be difficult for children to develop individual to determine what information about himself or morally if their primary relationships were ones where they herself can be communicated to others. The research were served by slaves. For there is little in that form of literature suggests that children and adults need some relationship that would require children to mutually privacy to develop a healthy sense of identity, to form "readjust" their interests and desires. attachments based on mutual trust, and to maintain the larger The benchmark then is, Can people engage substantively social fabric. The literature also shows that privacy in some in reciprocal relationships with humanoids? The word form exists cross-culturally. (See Friedman & Kahn [41] , "substantive" is important here. For it seems apparent that for an introduction to the conceptual and empirical literature robots already do engage people in at least certain forms of reciprocal interactions. For example, if in meeting a robot, the robot extends its arm for a handshake, it is likely the human will respond in kind and shake the robot's hand (Figure 3) 
